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Argument 
Sending the "position of special trust" element to the jury constituted plain 
error and the record does not support the conclusion that Beason's trial 
counsel "invited" the error. 
The state argues that this Court should not reach the merits of the statutory 
construction issue regarding the meaning of the "position of special trust" element found 
in Utah Code. Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (3)(h) (1995). The state contends that Beason has 
affirmatively waived this issue because (1) prior to trial Beason represented, through his 
first trial counsel, that he would not dispute he occupied a position of special trust, and 
(2) Beason waited until the state abandoned all other potentially applicable claims of 
aggravation before making his post-trial challenge. (State's Brief at 11). 
The state's first argument basically asserts that Beason waived the position of 
special trust issue since his original trial counsel suggested, contemporaneous with the 
preliminary hearing, that position of special trust would not be disputed. However, the 
position taken by a defendant at a preliminary hearing for the limited purpose of a 
probable cause finding is not binding thereafter. Parties often stipulate to certain 
matters at a preliminary hearing for a variety of different reasons. The significant 
procedural fact in this case is that at no time during any phase of the trial did Beason 
stipulate that he occupied a position of special trust which would have taken that 
particular aggravating factor away from the jury's consideration. Instead, position of 
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special trust was the very issue litigated by the parties during the sentencing phase and 
then submitted to the jury. 
In order to demonstrate plain error, Beason must establish three elements: (1) an 
error occurred, (2) the error was obvious, and (3) the error was harmful. State v. 
Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has described the 
rationale for the plain error rule as follows: 
[T]he doctrines of waiver and plain error serve to allocate the burden of 
noticing and correcting errors occurring at the trial court level. Generally 
speaking, the party harmed by an error has the burden of making a timely 
objection because that party has the greatest incentive to correct the error. 
Opposing parties and courts are not required to constantly survey or 
second-guess the nonobjecting party's best interests or trial strategy. On 
the other hand, where errors are particularly obvious or egregious and 
would serve no conceivable strategic purpose, courts and opposing parties 
may not simply turn a blind eye to a manifest procedural or substantial 
injustice. 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996). As the state correctly points out, plain 
error doctrine does not apply if trial counsel leads the trial court into committing trial 
error: 
If trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting to evidence as part of a 
trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of 
acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, were permitted to claim on appeal 
that the Court should reverse because it was plain error for the court to 
admit the evidence, we would be sanctioning a procedure that fosters 
invited error. Defendants are thus not entitled to both the benefit of not 
objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal. 
State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
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By focusing as it does on the strategic decisions of trial counsel, the invited error 
standard clearly aims at the deliberate decisions made by counsel. To that end, the state 
contends that it was Beason's lawyer who induced the state to withdraw its other claims 
of aggravation, leaving only the faulty aggravating factor at issue. (State's Brief at 13). 
To support this contention, the state points to the trial court's findings and conclusions 
on the motion to arrest judgment: "During the trial while both counsel and the judge 
were meeting in chambers after the verdict in the first phase of the trial, the State was 
persuaded to eliminate its other claims of aggravation and rely just on this position of 
special trust." (1 R. at 148-49; 2 R. at 273-74). 
Contrary to the state's position, the record does not reflect that it was Beason's 
trial counsel, rather than the trial judge or someone else, who did the persuading. The 
state's inference that it was Beason's trial counsel who persuaded the state to abandon its 
other claims of aggravation is not supported by the record. Moreover, there is simply no 
evidence that counsel's failure to object to the position of special trust element was a 
conscious strategic decision. In contrast, the opposite conclusion was clearly required in 
State v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), where the appellant 
"concede [d] on appeal that his attorney made a tactical choice not to object during the 
prosecutor's closing . . ." Therefore, because trial counsel consciously avoided making a 
timely objection to the prosecutors improper closing, the Winward court declined to 
review the alleged error under the plain error doctrine. Id 
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Failing to object to the position of special trust factor was mere inadvertence on 
the part of Beason's trial counsel and not some elaborate plan to lead the trial court into 
committing error. The invited error exception to the plain error doctrine has no 
application to this case. In addition, Beason's original trial counsel's stipulation did not 
operate as a waiver to any subsequent claims involving the position of special trust factor 
since counsel can stipulate to any number of matters at a preliminary hearing without 
being bound to those positions once the case goes to trial. 
The next issue is whether the error satisfies the three elements of the plain error 
test. First, in his opening brief Beason has provided the legal analysis demonstrating that 
an error occurred and that based on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (3) (h) 
the position of special trust factor should not have been submitted to the jury during the 
second phase of deliberations. That analysis will not be repeated here since the statutory 
construction issue has already been thoroughly analyzed. Second, it is clear that the 
error was obvious. Beason did not occupy a position of special trust, by virtue of his 
status as grandfather, in light of the language and structure of the statute and the 
conspicuous omission of grandparents from the list of culpable persons. Finally, it is self-
evident that the error was harmful since the jury's conclusion that Beason occupied a 
position of special trust resulted in improperly enhancing his convictions from second 
degree felonies to first degree felonies. Because Beason was convicted of aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child he is now serving two minimum mandatory sentences. Minimum 
4 
mandatory sentences could not have been imposed upon conviction of second degree 
felonies. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Beason requests this Court to 
reverse the denial of his motion to arrest judgment, vacate the judgments, and remand 
with instructions to reduce the first degree felony convictions to second degree felony 
convictions. 
DATED this / day of October, 1999. 
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